Oh dear, Spain's
Report Card gets worse . . .
- Per the EU Commission . . . Levels of poverty, inequality and social exclusion are among the highest in the EU. The gap between the wealthiest 20% and the poorest 20% is one of the largest in the EU and continues to rise. See here.
- Spain has dropped 3 places in an annual international assessment of the world's best countries. In contrast, the UK is now 3rd. More here.
Smack on cue, the
investigating judge in what's known as the Púnico corruption
case, has said there's prima facie reasons for taking a look at the
decisions of the ex mayoress of Madrid, Esperanze Aguirre - known to some as Spain's Maggie Thatcher. Whom no one thought could possibly have kept a clean nose but who left politics a few years ago smelling of roses. Almost. Note: At least I think it's the Púnico case but it could be one of the several others winding their way through the Spanish justice system right now. One gets as confused as some rather lenient judges obviously do.
Closer to home, we've learnt this week that the centre of Brazil's biggest corruption case is a brass-plate office in the centre of Pontevedra's old quarter rented by a lawyer by the name of Rodrigo Tacla Durán. Who was collared last week. So, it's not only our drug barons we can be proud of.
Hearing someone on a
News program referring to the UK's health service as our cherished
NHS got me thinking about its similarities with the EU.
Both are vast bureaucratic enterprises beyond the capabilities of
human management. Although founded on a base of incontrovertibly impressive ideals and although responsible for many good things, both cause
great misery to large numbers of people. And both are impervious to
sensible reform and are thus cracking under the weight of their
massive deficiencies. Like others, I've always seen both of them
eventually ceasing to exist but, like the author of the first EU article at
the end of this post, I now fear that the implosion of the EU is
actually coming too quickly. And I never thought I'd write that.
There's a second article on the mess the EU is in and then one on the NHS and a different approach to
financing it. I'm not convinced that would be enough to save it.
Finally . . . Is the Spanish or Galician dental market undergoing rapid growth? Or are high-street dental
practices a good front for money laundering? I ask this because one
of the latter sprouts on the streets of Pontevedra every 6 months or
so. Here's the latest, at the bottom of the old quarter, near Burgos
bridge and the market:-
Used to be a shop
selling the dowdiest of clothes for women. I wasn't surprised that
closed.
THE 3 ARTICLES
THE EU
1. We must leave the
EU quickly – it is falling apart faster than I thought
Allister Heath, The
Daily Telegraph
The EU is at
its weakest, most vulnerable since its creation, and it is now touch
and go whether it survives 2017 or whether it is swept away in a
catastrophic populist revolt
Hand over a €60
billion ransom or we won’t even start to discuss a trade deal:
that, if Jean-Claude Juncker is to be believed, will be the European
Union’s opening gambit ahead of Brexit.
Bring it on, I say: the
best way to expose a very weak adversary who is pretending to be very
strong is to call their bluff. Yet it may never even get to that. At
this rate, what is left of the EU could soon be begging us for a
trade deal, not the other way around.
The reality is that the
EU is edging ever-closer to the abyss: it is at its weakest, most
vulnerable since its creation, and it is now touch and go whether it
survives 2017 or whether it is swept away in a catastrophic populist
revolt.
Trouble is not only
brewing in France, where Marine Le Pen keeps gaining ground, but also
in the Netherlands, in Greece, in Italy and in eastern Europe.
Even if the dissidents
fail, for now, the EU will soon be crippled by Britain’s departure,
robbing it of its financial centre and billions of pounds a year in
net contributions.
The EU’s modus
operandi has always been to buy support with German and British
money, especially in poorer regions and in France’s agricultural
heartlands: when the cash runs out, or is replaced by some euro-tax,
tensions will flare up again.
We keep worrying about
how Brexit will affect Britain. But the real question is how Brexit
will debilitate Brussels, shift the balance of power and ideology on
the continent, with smaller, more pro-market nations losing their
British champion, and trigger a new dash to yet more unpopular
centralising treaties, fuelling more rage and anger. Yet the
Eurocrats in Brussels and some Remainers in Britain keep on talking
as if nothing has changed, as if the UK were leaving some powerful,
eternal, economically successful superpower. The status quo is gone,
forever, and what is left could be smashed further in just three
months’ time.
The most urgent threat
to the EU system comes from Le Pen. Her rise, the extent of which has
confounded everybody, is the most important story of the year. Her
hard-Left views on big companies, capital and trade are incompatible
with EU membership, as are her views on immigration; and she wants to
quit the euro.
France’s current,
already broken constitutional arrangements and “social contract”
wouldn’t survive. Le Pen’s election would detonate a neutron bomb
under all post-war institutions and the global economic order; a
disorderly French withdrawal from the euro, which would also lead to
others such as Italy following suit, would wipe trillions off asset
values and trigger another global financial crisis.
Le Pen is now polling
around 27 per cent in the first round and while she would still be
defeated in the second, surveys suggest she would grab an
unprecedented 42 per cent of the electorate. Given that this is a
rise of around five percentage points in just a few weeks, anything
is now possible, and it reflects the extreme, explosive
disenchantment among the French public with decades of economic,
social, immigration and crime policies. Even if she loses, the genie
will be well and truly out of the bottle.
The likes of Juncker, a
Marie Antoinette figure if ever there were one, are now so firmly
ensconced in a parallel reality, replete with alternative facts and
constructs, that they no longer understand what is happening. They
still look at the shiny new Europa building in Brussels, which cost
€321 million, and see a powerful, purposeful force for progress,
rather than an increasingly loathed, soon-to-be bankrupt bureaucracy
whose demise threatens the peace and prosperity of our civilisation.
They labour over their
preposterous economic models, telling us how impoverished the UK will
become as a result of us loosening our ties with an imaginary
fast-growing European economy, not realising that they are the victim
of an extraordinary case of cognitive dissonance. They look at the
world, but only see what they want to see, rather than what exists.
One of the reasons why
I backed Brexit was because the UK is the only major European country
able and willing to extricate itself from the doomed project in a
rational, pro-trade, pro-market way. Brexit allows us to show the
world that there is a better, more sustainable way to embrace real
globalisation without having to hand over power to corrupt, unelected
technocrats, and that wanting self-government doesn’t necessitate
voting for extreme, destructive National Front-style parties. So far,
it looks even better than I hoped, thanks to Theresa May’s
enthusiasm for free trade and her commitment to keep the country open
to capital and talent.
But where I may have
been over-optimistic was that I was hoping that the EU would survive
for at least another five years to 2022, giving Britain more time to
build new institutions, diversify our trade and show the rest of
Europe how it could be done. I was counting on the cyclical economic
upturn, which will give all European economies a boost, as well as on
an assumption that someone other than Le Pen would win in May, before
going on to fail to reform France and thus delivering the country
into her hands the next time around. Jacques Chirac failed to reform
France, as did Nicolas Sarkozy; one must hope that Francois Fillon
would pull it off, but that’s unlikely. Emmanuel Macron, a
fashionable neo-Blairite with no party backing, would fail
disastrously.
I’m no longer so sure
that we have so much time. It still seems likely that the EU will
stagger on for a few more years, just as it survived earlier crises,
but the day of reckoning is getting ever closer. We need to leave,
urgently, to insulate ourselves as best we can from the fallout.
Given the gravity of
the situation in France, the House of Lords should be debating how to
accelerate our withdrawal from the EU, not how to delay it. Big banks
should be planning on shifting bankers to Britain from France, not
(in one case) the other way around. Remainers should stop producing
anti-Brexit reports that massively exaggerate all of the difficulties
caused by leaving, and turn their attention instead to ways of
mitigating the fallout from the EU’s implosion.
It is in Britain’s
interest that the EU’s demise be carefully managed. Unfortunately,
it increasingly looks like the opposite will be true. The Government
should be hoping for the best, but planning ever-harder for the
worst.
2. The EU is
divided, fearful and in total disarray - there's just one thing the
27 agree on.
Peter Foster, the Daily
Telegraph
The European Union
stands on the cusp of momentous change: with Vladimir Putin menacing
in the east, Britain poised to leave and the streets fizzing with
populist discontent, the continent’s political establishment is
under greater threat than at any time since the Union’s inception.
But perusing an advance
copy of the conclusions for today’s EU leaders’ summit in
Brussels you wouldn’t guess anything much was amiss.
The entire document
reeks of just another damp day in Brussels at which the EU leaders
will (again) “reiterate the need to complete the banking union”,
urge member states to show “solidarity” on migration and
congratulate themselves on the “encouraging” news that European
unemployment, stratospheric after the 2008 financial crisis, is now
only sky-high.
At a time when you
might think that the Europe Union was reaching for a grand new vision
to revive its faltering project, the pallid memos coming out of
Brussels have taken on a near-hallucinatory, end-of-empire
complacency.
Viewed from some
quarters of a soon-to-be-liberated Britain, the entire EU
organisation now wears a deathly pallor that was summed up by
Jean-Claude Juncker’s anaemic White Paper on the future of Europe
released earlier this month.
Laying out five
scenarios for the future, Mr Juncker’s document was intended to
launch a rebirth of the Union. Alas, it was so short of intellectual
‘oomph’ that some senior EU diplomats now privately question
whether it can be used even as a starting point when leaders meet to
celebrate the 60th anniversary of the EU’s founding treaty in Rome
later this month.
Underlying the stunted
vision is the reality that on the really fundamental questions - on
the fiscal transfers needed to underpin the euro, on the shape of a
common EU defence policy, on migration and the core shared values of
the Union - there is no agreement. What looks like complacency is
actually the result of a profound policy paralysis that makes bold
plans for reform inconceivable.
There is much talk, for
example, of the need for a meaningful EU defence policy, in the light
of Brexit, Putin and Trump. But drill down into the detail and the
new EU defence plan is essentially an empty vessel, gutted by
disagreement between the major players.
The result is an EU
Headquarters, agreed this week, that must confine itself to
“non-executive military missions”. Even by EU standards, that’s
a gloriously tautology.
So while the new
eastern countries reject migrant quotas, multi-cultural values and
all forms of bossing from Brussels, on the euro – the EU’s
structural straitjacket - divisions between northern creditors and
debtor countries in the south mean that substantial progress on real
EU reform remains in stasis.
Eurosceptic parties may
not win power at the coming Dutch, French and German elections, but
their influence on the national policy agenda is surely going to make
it even harder to sell the ideas of Greek debt relief, a common
Eurozone deposit insurance scheme and the creation of a European
Monetary Fund.
That is why, when the
leaders of France, Germany, Spain and Italy met to discuss the future
of Europe in Versailles this week - the “formidable four” as one
commentator waspishly dubbed them – emerged with nothing of
substance.
With such fundamental
divisions, talk of rebooting the idea of a “two-speed Europe” is
just that – talk. Recalcitrant non-euro eastern states like Poland
and Hungary are determined not to be left behind while the core
Eurozone countries, who already to some degree move in a separate
orbit, cannot agree on the really big questions.
What is left, as this
week’s summit will so amply demonstrate, is just small-bore
projects and window-dressing.
Even where there is
agreement, such as the need to do more to counteract the rise of
Turkish and Russian influence in the Western Balkans, the very need
for talks is testament to the fact that the EU’s creeping failure
has allowed malign, anti-democratic influences to flourish.
The reality that the
current EU is in no fit state to welcome new members into the western
democratic fold reduces Europe’s attractiveness and influence in
the Balkans, and conversely increases the allure of the authoritarian
regimes of Putin and Erdogan. Talk in Brussels cannot mask these
fundamental new realities.
But here’s the rub:
surveying this Europe of division and dysfunction, it might be
tempting to conclude that the EU will prove a callow adversary when
confronted with the reality of a messy Brexit and a set of determined
British negotiators who - unlike David Cameron – really are
prepared to walk away.
It would be tempting,
but viewed from Brussels, it might also be wrong. If Mr Cameron’s
failed negotiation demonstrated anything it was that one of the
perverse consequences of the EU project’s slow unravelling is its
ability to unite in the face of a common threat. In this case that
threat is Britain, and its decision to demonstrate there is life
outside the Union.
The EU is divided in so
many areas, but on this question – that Britain must be seen to be
‘worse off out than in’ – it remains surprisingly united.
Less surprisingly - since the UK’s departure leaves all 27 states
out of pocket one way or another - the EU is equally united about the
fact that Britain must pay a hefty Brexit bill on departure.
Mr Cameron badly
over-estimated the EU’s ability to see that the best way to address
the public trust deficit was to reform. The members disagreed,
closing ranks and refusing to bend out-dated principles to new
political realities. Mrs May, with much higher stakes now for both
sides, is determined to try again.
She bets that when
faced with Brexit and the risk of chaos across capital markets and
car supply chains, the EU will this time opt for a more reasonable
course.
Maybe. But on past
form, the risks of the opposite outcome must remain high. As one
senior British official preparing for the negotiations confided
recently, the biggest danger for Britain is this fractious European
Union seeks to heal its differences by making Brexit the one issue on
which they find common cause.
3. THE UK NHS
It’s time for a
separate tax to fund the NHS
Daniel Finkelstein, The Times.
Here’s a sentence to
remember during today’s budget speech: “Within a year of the
foundation of the NHS, Labour had realised that the blank cheque on
social expenditure was not sustainable.”
With these words Brian
Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell’s biographer, begins his account of one of
the great battles of postwar politics — the tussle between two of
the rising ministers of Clement Attlee’s Labour government. On the
one side, chancellor Gaitskell, on the other the health minister who
had introduced the NHS, Aneurin Bevan. Should Labour, in its 1951
budget, impose charges for false teeth and spectacles?
There could only be one
winner. The chancellor imposed the charges and Bevan resigned. But it
wasn’t just Gaitskell’s authority as finance minister that
ensured victory. It was maths and reality.
As Nick Timmins records
in The Five Giants, his definitive history of the welfare state:
“The NHS proved spectacularly more expensive than expected. The
original estimate for the first nine months had been £132 million.
Actual spending, at £208 million proved two thirds higher. The first
full year, 1949-50, required another 70 per cent rise to £358
million.”
So of course Gaitskell
had to act and Attlee had to back him. The government didn’t just
need the money. It needed to establish the principle that NHS
spending would be controlled. At least a little bit. The 1950 figure,
£358 million, is the equivalent of about £8.5 billion now. In
2015-16 the budget of the NHS was £116.4 billion. Imagine where we
would be if Gaitskell had lost.
This history is worth
understanding as the chancellor rises to speak today. He may be able
to — and probably will — resist adding to his planned increases
in NHS spending. He is probably correct to judge that it is his job,
however difficult, to exercise some sort of control on the budget for
a service. Whatever his resistance, the pressure for more spending
will carry on and he or his successor will yield to it.
So he needs — we need
— a strategic approach. This is the truth about the path we are on:
it isn’t sustainable. In January the Office for Budget
Responsibility published its fiscal sustainability report for 2017.
Because it came out on the same day as the prime minister’s speech
about her European plans there wasn’t much discussion of it, but
the story it told was dramatic.
The OBR decided to take
account of the rising cost of healthcare in its projections of public
sector debt. The population is ageing, chronic health conditions are
becoming more prevalent and new expensive treatments are becoming
available all the time. All of these will push up health spending.
When William Beveridge
came up with the idea of the NHS he thought that the cost would fall
as the population became healthier. We have long known that he was
wrong. But we have only recently become aware that the potential for
innovation in care is almost limitless and that more of it will add
to cost rather than reduce it.
We can, for instance,
treat Aids sufferers now with costly drugs that they take for
decades. Tragically, only a few years ago they all died quite
quickly.
If there is no change
in policy towards healthcare and taxation, and the government from
time to time acts as all governments always have, granting more
funding to relieve pressure, the spending will drown the country in
debt.
Before the OBR included
these new health calculations, the national finances were in trouble.
With the new adjustment for rising health costs, these bad figures
look worse. Far worse. By the middle of the century, unless we do
something, our public-sector debt will be almost twice our national
income. By 2066, it will be heading towards 250 per cent of our
national income. That’s more than four times the proportion that is
usually regarded as acceptable.
So we can’t go on as
we are. We have to do at least one of three things: reduce the scope
of the services offered by the NHS, reform the service to increase
productivity, or pay more for healthcare. I suspect we will have to
do all three. And it seems entirely obvious that we should consider
all three together.
From time to time there
is a crisis in the NHS and we have a heated debate about health
spending. At other times we are concerned with the deficit and we
discuss spending control. Sometimes we talk about health reforms.
Wouldn’t it make sense if we did all these things at the same time?
That is the case, and a
strong one, for a separate, identifiable health tax. We wouldn’t
just be able to put more health spending on the national credit card
and we wouldn’t need to starve the NHS of funds when people wanted
more spending. When we discuss increasing health spending faster than
the economy, we would also have to discuss raising taxes to pay for
it. And the knowledge that tax rises might be required, and would
need to be argued for, would put pressure on the NHS to increase
productivity.
I do not favour this
approach in other areas — defence, say, or education. I think the
scale, the history and the projections of NHS spending make
healthcare different.
A separate NHS tax —
hypothecation, as it is called — has always been resisted by the
Treasury as eccentric and unnecessary. Nervous at proposing something
so unorthodox, I wasn’t much reassured to learn that the shadow
chancellor, John McDonnell, is tempted by the idea.
But the strength of the
case for an NHS tax, and the clear shortcomings of other approaches,
have persuaded Nick Macpherson, until recently Treasury permanent
secretary, that the idea now, as he put it in evidence to parliament,
“merits further examination”.
What he is suggesting
is that a budget for healthcare be set for five years at the
beginning of each parliament. During an election, the size of this
budget, its content and its tax consequences would then be debated
together. If a party wanted a big increase in spending on health it
would have to argue for a tax rise.
An incoming government
would then set a health tax for the parliament, with the Treasury
keeping the fund in balance if required. The best candidate for this
tax is national insurance, although its base would need to be
expanded so that older people chip in too, since they are the main
beneficiaries of the NHS.
Anyone got a better
idea? As I said, we can’t go on as we are.
No comments:
Post a Comment